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The governance of 
Scottish ferry services 
 
 
Professor Neil Kay, Department of Economics 
 
1.  Introduction 
 In this paper we argue that the present arrangements for 
review and implementation of Scottish Ferry policy are not 
competent and that, in particular the role and functions of 
Transport Scotland should be replaced by an independent 
regulator supported and directed by a sector-specific 
statutory framework.  The arguments here are buttressed by 
reference to serious and well-documented failures on the 
part of this agency and its predecessor government 
department in dealing with the areas of ferry governance 
with which they have been given responsibility.          
 
By “not competent” it is not intended to imply failures in 
terms of competence or performance on the part of any 
individual. Competence depends on context, training and 
perspective, the problems here are systemic and 
institutional and cannot be sorted by any review or reviews 
carried out by Transport Scotland itself.  The former Home 
Secretary John Reid once famously remarked that his 
Immigration Department was “not fit for purpose”.  What can 
be said about the present role and functions of Transport 
Scotland in the context of Scottish ferry policy is that they 
were not designed for purpose.   
 
This paper is intended to be read in conjunction with my 
2009 Fraser Commentary paper on Scottish ferry policy
1 
for 
which it can be treated as both an extension and update
2
.  It 
can however be read independently of that paper, though 
for reason of brevity and economy we shall avoid much of 
the technical and legislative detail covered in that earlier 
paper where possible.      
 
2.  The 2009 Fraser Ferry Policy Paper and 
update 
In the 2009 paper I concluded that “It is difficult to overstate 
both the scale of the failures in policy making with respect to 
Scottish ferries post-devolution, nor how unnecessary such 
failures have been”.  
 
Nothing that has happened since has done anything to 
moderate these views and indeed if anything, matters have 
worsened, the 2009 paper argued (as I and others had done 
since 2001) that whatever governance solutions were 
adopted as policy for Scottish ferry services that these 
should have as minimum specifications an independent 
regulator supported by a dedicated statutory regulatory 
framework and clearly specified operator of last resort, as 
tends to be standard as part of oversight provision for other 
UK essential public services.   
 
None of these are in place though the Scottish Government 
has recently announced that it will explore the possibility of 
an industry regulator backed by statutory legislation, this is 
discussed further below.  
 
However, the major problems that I identified in that paper 
still hold and in addition to the failures to put in place the 
regulatory safeguards that the network needs, there is still 
little evidence that there is proper recognition and 
understanding at official level of the opportunities and 
constraints represented by EU law in this context, in 
particular the roles played by public service obligations 
(PSOs), public service contracts (PSCs) and the Altmark 
principles.   In turn, there is failure to fully appreciate and 
explore issues associated with exclusivity provisions and 
methods for dealing with cherry picking,  all of which is 
provided for in EU law and associated guidelines.   
 
The major changes since 2009 relate to the first of the three 
major public service contracts that are set to be decided 
between now and 2013. The case is that of Gourock-
Dunoon
3
 and the outcome is frankly a shambles and 
disastrous for the public interest as it affects the taxpayer, 
the users, and the dependent communities.      
 
In 2007 the Scottish Government had come to power 
promising to build two vehicle-passenger ferries for the 
Gourock-Dunoon public service route, and indeed 
throughout the tender process it had been the Government‟s 
claim that they had been working towards a “town centre to 
town centre vehicle and passenger ferry service between 
Gourock and Dunoon
4
. The Government was aware that 
studies, including those sponsored by the Scottish 
Executive, confirmed the economic case for building these 
vessels
5
 and also confirmed that they would have to be built 
specially since suitable vessels would be unlikely to be 
obtained through the second hand market
6
.  They would 
have been aware there was no legal impediment to building 
and deploying these vessels
7 
as long as suitable accounting 
measures were put in place to make sure there was no 
leakage of subsidy from the foot passenger side to the 
vehicle-carrying side, as the European Commission had 
confirmed in an answer in 2007.  There was no change to 
EU law or guidelines relating to the issues that would have 
made a substantive difference to these issues over the 
period 2007-2011.  
 
What actually happened was a series of prevarications and 
confusions that at the very least demonstrated the kind of 
systemic failures of governance that I had argued in 2009 
showed the need for major institutional reform in this area. 
First, the Government claimed that EU law prevented them 
from building new ferries for the route
8
.  This was not true 
and never has been true, even the most charitable 
interpretation is that it displays complete misunderstanding 
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of EU law as it applies. Second, the Herald newspaper 
recently revealed that the Government made a covert offer 
to the private operator Western Ferries in 2007 that the 
Government would withdraw the CalMac vehicle-carrying 
public service if Western would run some of their vehicle-
carrying service into Dunoon Pier.  This would have reduced 
the potential market for (profitable) vehicle-carrying on the 
public service town centre route, increased the need for 
subsidy on the public service route, and increase the 
probability that the only option left for bidders for the route 
would be a passenger-only option.
9 
 Third, the Government 
claimed that a survey they had sponsored showed that 
suitable vehicle-carrying ferries were available on the 
second-hand market for Gourock-Dunoon (and by 
implication precluding the need to build them). Freedom of 
Information requests showed that this was not true.
10
       
 
There were other prevarications such as FoI-refuted claims 
by the Government that they were in active discussions with 
the European Commission
11 
and attempts to persuade the 
European Commission to extend the deadline for the new 
tender on what could only have been spurious grounds.
12
  In 
the end the winning tender for the town centre public service 
route was announced just after the May 5th Holyrood 
election, and as was widely expected was a passenger only 
option.  At a stroke this will degrade the options open to 
users on the town centre route, heavily increase subsidy 
unnecessarily compared to what would have been needed if 
the modern vehicle-passenger ferries needed for the route 
had been built and made available for the tender, create a 
vehicle-carrying private unregulated monopoly over a 
strategically important transport route, and impact heavily 
and adversely on dependent local economies and 
communities.  
 
However that is only one part of the Scottish ferry network, 
what is happening on Gourock-Dunoon is set to be a model 
that could destabilize much of the Scottish ferry network and 
fragile dependent communities.  That is only one part of the 
risks and threats to the public interest that failures at 
governance and policy level are creating here.     
 
3.  How we got here  
Domestic ferry services in most countries are treated as 
essential services and administered appropriately. On a 
straight mile-for-mile basis ferry travel can be one of the 
most expensive forms of transport modes and where ferries 
are used it is typically because there are few, if any, 
practical options.  They tend to have natural monopoly 
characteristics and often high levels of externalities with 
respect to local regional economic development. For those 
reasons, most countries subject their domestic ferry 
services to careful and systemic control, either through state 
ownership or regulatory oversight. 
 
Nationalization was the standard UK solution to an industry 
with these economic characteristics until Margret Thatcher‟s 
privatisation programme in the Eighties replaced state 
control with regulatory oversight in most of these cases.  
The pattern was fairly standard; a nationalised industry 
would be replaced by a competitive tendering resulting in a 
series of privately-owned companies with an independent 
regulator and a sector-specific statutory framework.  Each 
case incorporated necessary checks and balances such as 
provision for an operator of last resort should any incumbent 
operator default or otherwise threaten breaches of its 
contract.  
 
With post-war domestic Scottish ferry services being 
dominated by one large nationalized ferry operator 
Caledonian Macbrayne, this fitted into the first part of the 
story of how such natural monopolies came to be 
administered in the UK.  Where the story parted company 
with the standard script in the Thatcher era of transformation 
through privatization and regulation was that Scottish ferry 
services remained for the most part in state-owned hands.        
 
In my 2009 paper on Scottish ferry policy in the Fraser 
Commentary, I covered some of the background to this 
anomaly which to a large extent revolved around the fact 
that while ferry services were an integral part of much of the 
Scottish transport network in the north and west of the 
country, this was simply not a major issue south of the 
border apart from the very localized case of the Isle of Wight 
ferries which were already run by private companies.  
 
A contributory problem here is that while air, rail, and road 
policy is highly visible to transport policy makers and 
commentators who may depend on (or at least observe) 
these services themselves, much of what happens on 
domestic Scottish ferry services tends to impact on 
peripheral, scattered and isolated communities. The debacle 
of the Edinburgh trams has received high levels of coverage 
in the Scottish media and there is high public awareness 
that there are major public interest issues at stake here - 
even if there is less awareness of exactly what the issues 
are.  However, there was far little coverage and public 
awareness of the fact that the first Northlink ferry contract 
serving the Northern Iles (Orkney and Shetland from 
Aberdeen) effectively collapsed with forced retendering in 
2004 after the operator receiving a multi-million pound bail 
out following its threats to withdraw from the route.  Yet 
these ferry services to the Northern Isles are essential 
public services with many communities and businesses in 
Orkney and Shetland dependent on them for their survival. 
And no matter what can be done to salvage the Edinburgh 
trams project it is highly unlikely that it will ever achieve the 
status of essential public service. 
 
Similarly, at the end of this month the CalMac Gourock-
Dunoon town centre to town centre vehicle-passenger 
service will end after several decades of operation and be 
replaced by a passenger-only service.  This leaves by 
default an unregulated private firm (Western Ferries) as 
monopoly operator of vehicle-carrying ferry services over 
the Clyde Estuary, the road option involving a detour of 84 
miles. While the traffic numbers on The Clyde Estuary are of 
course much smaller than across the Forth Estuary, in 
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transport terms this is comparable to giving a private firm 
the keys to the Forth Bridge with no direct control by 
government over pricing and other strategic decisions.  
 
A further problem is at the level of individual markets like 
Gourock-Dunoon, the scale of any possible market 
distortion is likely to fall below the radar of the OFT, even 
though they may have profound effects on local economies 
and communities.  However, in the aggregate the failures of 
successive governments to put in place a coherent (or 
indeed any) statutory framework for regulating Scottish ferry 
services means that the system is simply unable to deal 
competently and coherently with standard problems that 
regulators of other essential services face on a regular 
basis, such as monopoly pricing and delivery of services, 
market entry, cherry picking, exclusivity, public service 
obligations (PSOs) versus public service contracts  (PSCs) 
and operator of last resort.  
 
The problem with the governance of Scottish ferry service is 
that for the last decade it has been mis-specified as a 
problem by government.  It has been largely defined and 
seen as a transport sector where subsdised public services 
would now have to be made subject to competitive 
tendering to be made compliant with EU law. While this is 
correct as far as it goes, this has helped obscure the fact 
that the self-regulatory function that nationalisation had filled 
now left a regulatory gap that would have to be replaced for 
these essential services if matters were not to fall apart.  But 
the supposed urgency of the need to comply with EU 
regulations meant government since 2000 brushed aside 
such arguments arguing that matters were too urgent for 
such luxuries as proper regulatory oversight. In 2000, the 
Executive stated they were “aiming to have the first tender 
in place by Spring 2001 with implementation to follow”
13 
 a 
time horizon which was never realistic as I and others 
pointed out
14
. In the event the first CalMac tender for Clyde 
and Hebrides ferry services began in October 2007, the 
imminent (though ever-receding) deadline for tendering 
effectively capping and neutering any chance of reasoned 
debate.       
 
In 2001 when the issue of need for an Independent 
Regulator of competitively tendered ferry services was 
raised by me and others to the then Scottish Executive and 
the Scottish Parliament, the response was that “The 
Transport Minister when questioned on (the subject of an 
Independent Regulator) continues to state that it is not 
needed since the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is 
responsible for safety
15
.   
 
While of course it is the Minister who is held responsible and 
accountable for not knowing that the term „independent 
regulator‟ generally refers to an agency with an economic 
function.  Iit was such a briefing from officials which made it 
impossible to make headway on this issue with successive 
ministers, despite it being raised repeatedly by me and 
others to the Executive and Parliament, including in invited 
evidence to Inquiries into ferry tendering held in each of the 
first three sessions of the Scottish Parliament.   
 
4.  Where we are now  
Two statements by Scottish Cabinet Secretaries with 
respect to the Gourock-Dunoon tendering issue in recent 
weeks reinforce the above points.  First in response to the 
Gourock-Dunoon debacle, the Government news release 
quoted John Swinney, Cabinet Secretary for Finance and 
Sustainable Growth:    
 
“the Government is now examining the scope for 
introducing a statutory ferry regulator which could 
have strong powers to ensure there is no predatory 
commercial activity on any Scottish ferry route”
16 
          
 
While it may be seen as something that, at least, there is at 
last official recognition of the need for a regulator with 
statutory powers here, albeit ten years late, the reasons 
given for it reflect further misunderstanding of the scale and 
nature of the economic problem here.  Predatory behaviour 
or predation in economics refers to anti-competitive 
behaviour such as pricing below cost to drive rivals out the 
market.  This was not an issue on Gourock-Dunoon where 
the market distortions were largely created by government 
intervention rather than corporate action, nor is it likely to be 
one of the major issues for a regulator in the markets under 
discussion here.  Indeed, the problems created and 
buttressed through government restrictions on the Gourock-
Dunoon on Gourock-Dunoon were the opposite of predation 
with the dominant position already achieved for the private 
sector operator allowing it to achieve operating margins 
averaging about 27% in recent years
17
.   
 
Just talking about creating a regulator without first having a 
clear sight of what, how, and who he is she is supposed to 
be regulating is rather like appointing an umpire without 
giving them a rule book. Even who they would regulate 
needs to be made clear – for example, does it include 
private unsubsidized firms plying routes that are classifiable 
as public service routes under EU law? Eleven years after 
the issues of competitive tendering of nationalised ferry 
services first appeared on the political map there is no 
evidence that such questions are appearing on the agenda, 
let alone being answered. 
 
The second statement regarding Gourock-Dunoon was by 
Alex Neil Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure and Capital 
Investment to the Scottish Parliament June 2nd  2011  
 
Alex Neil: “The origin of the contract and tender 
was essentially the European Commission. The 
Scottish Government had no option other than to 
tender the service. We had to take decisions on 
the basis of the tenders that were returned, and 
we took the option that involved the absolute 
minimum number of redundancies. Had we taken 
any other option, the number of redundancies 
involved would have multiplied by four. I take it 
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that all members in the chamber will welcome the 





While some members and interested parties might indeed 
welcome a policy and decision under competitive tendering 
that was taken on the basis of minimising redundancies, 
such a policy raises serious questions under competitive 
tendering and extant law as it relates to these issues. It is 
perhaps a reflection of the low level of awareness of these 
issues that this point does not seem to have been picked up 
and subjected to further discussion and investigation, 
whether in or out of Parliament.       
 
At this point it should be noted there is a Ferries Review
19
 
which has been conducted over most of the life of the last 
Parliament and is publicised by the Government as intended 
to provide a basis for “a long-term plan for ferry services to 
2022”. This will not shed much light on the issues that 
matter here, indeed it has the potential to not just have 
wasted much public money but to make things even worse.    
 
The Review has been set up to heavily reflect the views of 
“stakeholders” which in the way it has been conducted more 
reflects commercial interests rather than those of the public 
and the communities seen to be served.  This is rather like 
inviting the foxes to participate in the design of the chicken 
coup.  By all means observe the reactions of creatures of a 
vulpine persuasion to your first efforts at a chicken coup and 
be prepared to modify your efforts in the light of these 
observations. But an effective chicken coup, just like an 
effective regulatory framework should first start with the 
experience of others who have faced similar problems, 
whether it is farmers in the case of stock protection or 
regulators in the case of essential public services. And the 
Summary
20
 of consultation questions asked in the Review 
confirms that the quality and content of answers received 
will unfortunately reflect the quality and content of questions 
asked (how is anyone supposed to phrase a meaningful 
reply to “Do you agree that the ferry service should be 
designed to meet the most important needs of the 
community?”).  
 
So where do we stand now in terms of Scottish Ferry 
Services?  We have a rag bag of pricing, investment, public 
procurement and public infrastructure policies that not only 
vary between contracts but sometimes even within contracts 
(such as the RET “trial” applied for several years so far to 
parts of the Clyde and Hebrides network but not others) . 
The Gourock-Dunoon contract has finished in a shambles, 
the Northlink tender is due for retendering in 2012 and there 
is no sign that the Government has learnt the lessons that 
matter from the previous fiasco that resulted in bail out and 
forced retendering here (my efforts to persuade the then 
Scottish Executive that this proved the need for an operator 
of last resort was rebuffed by officials). 
 
But then in 2013 comes the retendering of CalMac and the 
Clyde and Hebrides contract again. This, more than 
anything else, reflects the crossed fingers and head-in-the-
sand approach to these issues by government.  
 
There are two possible scenarios from the tendering of 
CalMac in the form of the Clyde and Hebrides contract 
every six years under EU law. The first depends on CalMac 
(holding company state-owned David MacBrayne) winning 
the contract in perpetuity every time it comes up for 
retendering.  In a level competitive playing field that is a bit 
like throwing a dice and betting on the same number coming 
up every time. It might happen, but then other parties might 
want to have a look at the dice, or at least question whether 
it is worthwhile tossing the dice at all.  But if the “CalMac in 
perpetuity” scenario does hold and goes unchallenged, the 
only major cost is the unnecessary waste down the years of 
millions of pounds of public and private money spent on 
retendering process and a time horizon for operators and 
policy makers dictated by the time of the next retender.  But 
if this scenario holds, then whatever it is, it is not competitive 
tendering and this would inevitably become clear to potential 
operators and the EC.  .  
 
The second and more dangerous scenario is that eventually 
CalMac loses its contract to another EU bidder. At this point, 
if there was a coherent regulatory framework in place as for 
other essential services then at least there is potential to 
guard against problems from moral hazard, adverse 
selection, opportunistic behaviour, technical or financial 
failure on the part of the incumbent operator. But obviously 
these safeguards would have to be in place before the 
tender process takes place, you do not start re-writing the 
rule book once the game has started and you are worried 
about who is winning, just as you do not start looking for an 
operator of last resort when you need then to start 
tomorrow.  
 
The dangers of such a scenario would be great enough 
even with a coherent regulatory framework in place with one 
single private operator dominating Scottish ferry services. 
Without such a framework there would be numerous 
potential threats to the public interest, most obviously from 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the new incumbent, 
as any experienced industry regulator would almost 
certainly advise. And with CalMac having been presumably 
been wound up since it had lost its contract and only 
business, there would be no obvious alternative open to the 
Scottish Government in the event of such problems.  Even if 
Northlink as another subsidiary of state-owned David 
Macbrayne was still available in principle, the scale and 
diversity of the CalMac network is at much greater levels 
than that faced by Northlink.  I simply do not know what 
would happen if a private operator that had won the Clyde 
and Hebrides contract from CalMac started acting 
opportunistically and threatened to withdraw unless the 
government paid up, but much more importantly it is fairly 
clear the government does not know either, or at least does 
not want to think about it.  The lesson from other regulated 
industries involving essential services is that the crossed 
fingers and head-in-the-sand approach does not work with 
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operators whose obligations are to their shareholders, you 
have to anticipate how the operators might exploit any 
loopholes or other forms of advantage and set up regulatory 
safeguards in advance, not deal with them from a blank 
page once they arise.                  
                              
Meanwhile, cherry picking and unrestricted market entry can 
proceed to undermine public service contracts quite 
unaffected by these contractual issues. Cherry picking has 
had varying degrees of success in different parts of the 
Scottish ferry network;  it is fewer routes, that have been 
and will be,  typically targeted for cherry picking.  More 
segments of routes such as vehicle carrying, short 
crossings, freight and livestock, with high season cherry 
picking also being a possibility but not yet really in evidence.  
Cherry picking in the context of Scottish ferry services can 
cream off the profitable segments of the joint product 
provided by vehicle/freight/passenger vessels, leaving any 
high cost (mostly crewing levels for safety reasons)  and low 
revenue loss-making  passenger-only public service to bear 
a higher level of subsidy if it is to be provided at all.  The 
dangers of cherry picking in ferry services are arguably 
greater than for most other essential services such as postal 
services since local natural monopoly characteristics reduce 
or more likely eliminate the chances of competition amongst 
cherry pickers. Also in general these tend not be 
contestable markets once entry has been achieved and 
incumbency established because of typically limited access 
to suitable vessels and/or infrastructure.     
 
The failure to realize these issues is reflected in the 
possibility raised in the current Ferries Review consultation    
 
“As a first step, we could test some routes by 
tendering them singly. This would encourage the 
commercial ferries market to provide services 
wherever possible leaving only the services 
which are unlikely to attract operations on a 
commercial basis (i.e. without subsidy) to be 






But if there are any routes on the Scottish ferry network 
which could be profitable providing a full complement of 
user services, including what are usually loss-making 
services for foot passengers, a market entrant could 
potentially make even more profit by cherry picking the 
profitable segments of that market, such as vehicles.  There 
is no exclusivity provision at the moment to stop market 
entry outside existing or projected public service contracts 
(part of the reason for the Northlink tender collapse), which 
is also exactly what happened in the case of Gourock-
Dunoon.  Why should any firm tender for a public service 
contract when it can cherry pick the time, level and form of 
entry that suits it and simply crowd out any similar services 
that are offered by the public service operator?  Indeed just 
a few weeks before the Scottish Government‟s Ferries 
Review was asking questions last year as to whether 
Ardrossan-Brodick was one of the routes that should be 
considered for single route tender
22
,  Western Ferries had 
announced their intention to enter into direct competition 
with CalMac on Ardrossan-Brodick using a similar market 
entry strategy to that employed in Gourock-Dunoon; “we are 
looking to take to Arran those elements of that model which 
have allowed Western Ferries to run a commercially 
successful service against a heavily subsidised service 
provided by CalMac.”
23
   
 
If anything could be taken to epitomize Government‟s 
current ferry policy it is the contrast between the unreality of 
what they think could happen here and the reality of what 
the market was and is actually planning.  This was visible to 
see for anyone who picked up a national newspaper, and 
not just in 2010; Western Ferries also has had a long-
standing and publicly expressed interest in entering the Bute 
market using a similar business model to Gourock-Dunoon.    
 
5.  What should be done? 
 
The model (if it can be described as such) for governance of 
the Scottish ferry network is simply unsustainable. Either 
faith is placed in the likes of CalMac winning its retender 
indefinitely (an expensive and highly improbable outcome 
with competitive tendering and assuming a level playing 
field), or we face the unacceptable dangers of the major part 
of the Scottish ferry network and the associated essential 
public services being eventually captured by a commercial 
interest that is not subject to the normal checks and 
constraints that are standard practice in other essential 
public services in the UK. Further, even in the absence of 
the worst case of capture by a poorly regulated commercial 
interest, the network as a whole faces progressive 
disintegration and erosion though unrestricted and 
unregulated cherry picking   It is not as if government has 
been unaware of the dangers of cherry picking, there has 
been public discussion of the dangers by the Scottish 
Executive and the Scottish Parliament since 2001. But it has 
proven difficult or impossible to convince policymakers that 
focusing only on routes does not get to the roots of what 
cherry picking will target.  Just as in postal services they will 
seek low cost or high value services of individual routes and 
be willing, indeed delighted, to leave the high cost and low 
value segments of any route for a public service and the tax 
payer to pick up.         
 
The problem is that there is absolutely no evidence that any 
of this is on the Scottish Government‟s radar.  There is a 
debate to be had, and reasoned arguments on both sides, 
as to whether most of the Scottish ferry network should be 
run by a single state-owned holding company or whether 
most of it should be in private hands, much of it awarded 
through public service contracts.  There is also a debate to 
be had, and reasoned arguments on both sides, as to 
whether or not some routes should be tendered separately 
rather than as part of the main CalMac bundle, effectively to 
institutionalize cherry picking and bring in a degree of 
oversight by government. Indeed these very debates were 
encouraged in the current Scottish Ferries Review.  The 
problem is that the debates are irrelevant, a waste of time 
Vol.35 No.1, pp.46-52. 
 
and even counterproductive since they are not predicated 
on a real understanding of commercial logic and interests, 
let alone what EU law permits and prohibits in this context. 
In the absence of coherent oversight the market will provide 
its own solutions and one of the first lessons students learn 
in Economics 101 is that you cannot just rely on crossed 
fingers to ensure that private interest aligns with the public 
interest.         
 
While the present outcomes for ferry services in Scotland 
are not sustainable, there are alternatives which are, and 
these include alternatives already put before the Scottish 
Executive and the Scottish Parliament.  One example was in 
fact the default option which had been the outcome of 
discussions between the Scottish Executive and the 
European Commission in 2000 and included splitting the 
CalMac Clyde and Hebrides networks into 3 or 4 separate 
bundles and tenders.  Advantages of this option included 
the fact that provision to act as operator of last resort for 
other tenders in the network could be simply included as a 
clause (with appropriate provision for compensation) in each 
tender agreement. Disadvantages included any possible 
sacrifice of economies of scale that could have been 
achieved through a single tender.  Other options include the 
one which I submitted to the Scottish Executive and the 
Scottish Parliament in 2005 and which is discussed in more 
detail in my 2009 Fraser Commentary paper. This option 
provided for the operation of public services including the 
CalMac network by a single state owned body without the 
need for expensive regular retendering and under 
compliance with EC guidelines as reflected in the Altmark 
principles.  
 
As discussed in my 2009 Fraser Commentary paper, the 
Executive rejected my proposal in 2005, advising the 
Scottish Parliament that the Altmark principles were not 
applicable to Scottish ferry services. Three years later in 
2008, the European Commission opened up a State aid 
investigation of Scottish ferry services on the basis that the 
services had to comply with the Altmark principles and there 
were grounds for suspecting that the government had failed 
to ensure this. 
 
Reading these last two sentences together should have 
been sufficient evidence that policy here was not being 
framed in a competent and coherent manner.  However it 
made no visible or discernable difference as to who handled 
policy here or how it was handled.    
 
How can this be changed? The first thing to recognize that 
what is completely missing from the governance of ferry 
services in Scotland is a set of institutional guidelines 
embedded in a statutory rule book similar to other essential 
services. What is needed here is a process by which ways 
for dealing with these problems can be set up.  If the 
problem is defined properly by Parliament as “the provision 
of competitively tendered essential ferry services under EC 
law” this problem could be considered by a small, say 6 
members, Independent Expert Group in which the core 
would be experienced experts from regulated essential 
services (such as energy, postal services, telecoms) with 
input from experts in relevant EC law and ferry services.  
The terms of reference of the Group would be to frame 
institutional and regulatory options for ferry services in 
Scotland.    
 
How to pursue this? The normal procedure and default 
option would be for such a Group to be set up by the 
Scottish Government.  But that brings us back full square to 
where we started with these problems.   There have been 
three full sessions of the Scottish Parliament since 1999, 
there have been Inquiries into the tendering of Scottish ferry 
services in each one of them, and I and others have given 
invited expert evidence to each of these three Inquiries. The 
pattern has been fairly standard so far: evidence given by 
me and others; followed by polite, patient, and informed 
questioning by MSPs on the appropriate Committee; 
followed by representations and/or questions by the 
Committee to the Scottish Executive / Scottish Government; 
followed by explicit or implicit rejection of points for possible 
reform or re-assessment of policy by the Executive/ 
Government; followed by another Inquiry into the tendering 
of Scottish ferry services in the following session of 
parliament about 3 or 4 years later.  
 
Proposals for such an Independent Expert Group have been 
made by me before through a Scottish Parliament Transport 
Committee Convener and suffered the same fate that most 
sensible proposals for reform have suffered once they faced 
neutralizing by advice and intervention of officials.  This is 
understandable and quite rational, it takes a lot to expect 
any institution or group to objectively evaluate and advise on 
proposals that are based on the premise that the group or 
institution in question does not have the commences 
required to adequately perform the tasks with which they 
have been entrusted.     
 
The only real opportunity that such an Independent Expert 
Group would have of being formed with the right skills on 
board and with resources and opportunities to do their job 
properly would be if it was truly independent of official 
interference in its formation and operation.  For that you 
would need a strong Parliament and/or a strong Minister.  I 
must say that my experience over more than a decade has 
led me to advise caution and against over-optimism on 
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 And in which context I must declare an interest as a user of the 
fery sernvices here  
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